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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from a final order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable L.A. Dever. Plaintiff appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j).

The Utah Supreme Court,

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the District Court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Fireman's Rule?
Standard of Review
An order granting summary judgment is appropriate and should be affirmed where
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fenn v. Redman Venture, Inc., 101 P.3d 387, 389 (Utah
App. 2004) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

Questions of law are reviewed for

correctness. Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 108 P.3d 741, 745 (Utah 2005). The
issue of the appropriateness of the District Court's grant of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment was preserved for appeal in the District Court by Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 88-126)
and through oral argument on March 16, 2005.
2

III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves application of the Fireman's Rule which prevents firefighters
and police officers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment from
recovery based on negligent conduct that requires their presence and assistance.
Defendant Ryan Oldroyd ("Oldroyd") submits that the District Court's order granting his
Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of the Fireman's Rule was appropriate and
should be affirmed.
The facts are undisputed. Oldroyd was involved in a single car rollover accident
on December 28, 2003 on the eastbound 600 South offramp from 1-15 in Salt Lake City,
Utah, when he lost control of his vehicle as he encountered snow and/or ice. (R. 2).
Following Oldroyd's accident, both Utah Highway Patrol troopers and Salt Lake City
police officers responded to the scene. Among the Utah Highway Patrol troopers
responding was the Plaintiff, Richard G. Fordham ("Fordham"). When Fordham arrived
on the scene, two other highway patrol troopers were already there, as well as one or
more Salt Lake City police officers. (R. 57). Fordham positioned his vehicle in the
number two eastbound travel lane, and after doing so went to the rear of his highway
patrol vehicle to retrieve flares. (R. 56-58). While doing so, Fordham was struck by
another vehicle driven by Zhi Wu which encountered ice and/or snow and lost control.
(R. 42-43). At the time Fordham was struck, Oldroyd had been assisted from his vehicle
and was in another officer's car filling out paperwork. (R. 62-63).
3

Subsequent to the accident, Fordham settled with Zhi Wu, the driver of the vehicle
which struck him, for her liability insurance policy limits of $50,000.00. Fordham also
received Worker's Compensation benefits through his employment with the Utah
Highway Patrol. Appellant's Brief ("Br.") at 5. Fordham filed this action seeking
damages from Oldroyd for his alleged negligence in connection with the subject incident
on December 28, 2003. Following the parties' depositions, Oldroyd filed his Motion for
Summary Judgment on the basis that the Fireman's Rule prohibits Fordham from
maintaining his action against Oldroyd for injuries sustained when Fordham was struck
by another driver while he was at the scene of Oldroyd's accident in the course and scope
of his employment with the Utah Highway Patrol. (R. 39-87). After oral argument
conducted on March 16,2005, the District Court granted Oldroyd's Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R. 163-64). This appeal followed.
IV.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The District Court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
on the basis of the Fireman's Rule. While application of the Fireman's Rule appears to
be an issue of first impression in Utah, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that
have addressed the issue have accepted the Fireman's Rule (also known as the
"Professional Rescuers Doctrine") which provides that firefighters and police officers who
are injured in the course and scope of their employment may not recover based on
negligent conduct that requires their presence and assistance.
4

The Fireman's Rule

recognizes that law enforcement officers, such as Fordham, as part of their profession,
are paid for and voluntarily confront hazards causing injury in return for compensation.
Under such circumstances, it is inappropriate for such individuals to then seek
compensation from those they are paid to protect. As a result, the decision of the District
Court to grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed.
V-

ARGUMENT

The Fireman's Rule, which was the basis for the District Court's Order Granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in this case, has been defined as follows:
The "Fireman's Rule" is a widely recognized rule which, where it is
followed, prevents firefighters and police officers injured in the course of
their duties from recovering from those whose negligence proximately
caused their injuries or from the owner or occupant of premises who is
responsible for creating the condition requiring their presence on the
property. The Fireman's Rule has been applied to preclude recovery
against negligent motorists for injuries sustained by police officers which
were reasonably foreseeable in the course of their duties on the highway.
The rule is applicable where a police officer is responding to or
investigating an automobile accident and where an officer is injured as a
result of a motorist's actions in negligently stopping on a highway.
Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic §691.
The Fireman's Rule is based upon sound public policy considerations, and has been
adopted by the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have considered it. For
example, in Waggoner v. Troutman Oil Co., 894 S.W.2d 913 (Ark. 1995) (R. 135-140),
the Arkansas Supreme Court, in a case adopting the "almost universally accepted"
Fireman's Rule, noted that twenty-three states and the District of Columbia had adopted
5

the rule while only three states had rejected it either by case law or statute. Six years
later, in Moody v. Delta Western, Inc., 38 P.3d 1139 (Alaska 2002) (R. 142-46), the
Alaska Supreme Court joined the overwhelming majority of states that have adopted the
Fireman's Rule. In that case, the court noted that, "Nearly all of the courts that have
considered whether or not to adopt the Fireman's Rule have in fact adopted it." KL at
1140. The court went on to cite cases from thirty-two jurisdictions adopting the rule,
while only noting one jurisdiction, Oregon, which had rejected it.
Public policy considerations supporting the Fireman's Rule have been discussed
in numerous cases from many jurisdictions. For example, in Steelmanv. Lind, 634 P. 2d
666 (Nev. 1981) (R. 66-68), the Nevada Supreme Court, in a case factually similar to
this case, held that the Fireman's Rule barred an action by a highway patrol trooper
against a vehicle owner who had stopped on an interstate roadway to reload beehives that
had slipped off a trailer. After positioning highway flares, the highway patrol trooper,
Steelman, was rearended and injured by a vehicle operated by another individual. The
Court stated:
Such officers, in accepting the salary and fringe benefits offered for the job,
assume all normal risks inherent in the employment as a matter of law and
thus may not recover from one who negligently creates such risk. See e.g.
Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wash.2d 975, 530 P.2d 254 (1975); Burden v.
Midwest Indus., 380 S.W.2d 96, 98-99 (Ky. 1964). If this were not the
rule, citizens would be reluctant to seek aid of a public safety officer or to
have such aid sought in their behalf upon fear that a subsequent claim for
injury by the officer might be far more damaging than the initial fire or
assault. To hold otherwise would create far too severe a burden upon
6

homeowners in keeping their premises reasonably safe for the unexpected
arrivals of police and firemen.

It was the duty of Steelman, a highway patrol trooper, to take affirmative
action to protect anyone found in a precarious situation upon the highway
from additional harm. Action, such as that taken by Steelman, on behalf
of Lind, a motorist in distress, as well as other motorists travelling upon the
highway, forms a part of what troopers are hired to do and falls directly
under the ordinary course of the duties of the occupation.

For the reasons expressed above, we hold that as a matter of law, appellant
is barred by the Fireman's Rule from maintaining an action against Lind
and affirm the summary judgment.
634 P.2d at 427-29.
In Young v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 569 A.2d 1173 (D.C. App. 1990), the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants in a
suit involving a firefighter who was injured by an attempt to catch a truck driver as he
fell from a bridge. Commenting on the rationale supporting the Fireman's Rule, the
Court stated:
The professional rescuer doctrine (characterized in some jurisdictions as
the "fireman's rule") generally bars those whose business it is to prevent
injury and save lives from tort recovery for injuries sustained from known
hazards in the course of their work. (Citation omitted.) While the doctrine
originally developed in other jurisdictions in the context of landowner
liability law, (citation omitted) the modern rationale for the doctrineindeed, its basis in the District of Columbia-is that a professional rescuer
has assumed the risks of his or her employment and is compensated
accordingly by the public, both in pay and in worker's compensation
7

benefits in the event of injury, (citation omitted). While the reality may be
that a professional rescuer's pay and benefits are often inadequate to
compensate for a given injury, the fact remains that a professional rescuer
knows before accepting the employment both what the risks of the job are
and what the compensation and benefits will be. The professional rescuer
doctrine also seeks to avoid a potential proliferation of lawsuits, and thus
represents a policy decision that the tort system is an inappropriate
mechanism for compensating professional rescuers injured in the course of
their inherently risky employment.
Young. 589 A.2d at 1175.
In Miller v. Inglis. 567 N.W.2d 253 (Mich. App. 1997), the Michigan Court of
Appeals, commenting on the Fireman's Rule, stated:
Courts in many jurisdictions throughout the United States have adopted a
common-law rule that bars public safety officials such as firefighters and
police officers from suing tortfeasors for injuries sustained in the course of
the public safety officer's employment. The "professional rescuers rule,"
or "the fireman's rule", as it is called in Michigan, (citation omitted) is a
creature of the common law, and as such, it has been defined and refined
case by case. Courts have cited several reasons to justify the firemans'
rule-these include the view that (1) rescue officers know the dangers of the
job when they apply for it, (2) the purpose of the public safety profession
is to confront danger, and (3) the public should not be held liable for
damages or injuries that arise from the function that police officers and
firefighters are intended to fulfill. (Citations omitted.)
567 N.W.2d at 162-63.
The dissent, in a case cited by Appellant, Lave v. Newmann, 317 N.W. 2d 779
(Neb. 1982) (R. 107-09), eloquently stated the purposes for and public policy supporting
the Fireman's Rule as follows:
The Fireman's Rule has withstood attack in other jurisdictions from those
who misunderstand its genesis and underlying policy. See Walters v.
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Sloan. 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977), which
noted that the principle denying recovery to those voluntarily undertaking
the hazard causing injury is fundamental in a number of doctrines, including
nullification of the duty of care, satisfaction of the duty to warn because the
hazard is known, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk, as well
as in the fireman's rule. The rule finds its clearest application in a situation
where a person who, fully aware of the hazard created by the defendant's
negligence, voluntarily confronts the risk for compensation. Firemen and
policemen are paid for the work they perform and are prepared to face the
hazards of their employment and deal with perils when they arise. When
death, injury, or disability occurs, compensation is provided not only
through the workman's compensation law, but, in certain circumstances, by
other special benefit statutes.
317 N.W. 2d at 782-83 (Caporale, J., dissenting).
Fordham argues that the basic philosophy of Utah tort law and the provisions of
the Liability Reform Act of 1986, Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to 43, require that each
tortfeasor must pay his or her share of damages caused to a plaintiff by negligence. (Br.
at 12-13). While this is generally the case, there are exceptions in the Code, itself, for
negligent employers, employees, governmental entities and governmental employees.
These exceptions are based upon public policy reasons. Similarly, the overwhelming
majority of states that have adopted the Fireman's Rule have done so for valid public
policy reasons, and not merely under a limited "assumption of risk" analysis as suggested
by Fordham. In short, there is no violation of the basic philosophy of Utah tort law
created by application of the Fireman's Rule.
Likewise, the Worker's Compensation statutes, in particular Utah Code Ann.
§34A-2-106, are compatible with the Fireman's Rule. Fordham argues that because an
9

injured employee is allowed to sue a negligent third party for injuries sustained by the
employee while on the job, and no exception for firemen or police officers is set forth
in the statute, application of the Firemans' Rule is inconsistent with this section. (Br. at
13). This is not the case. Application of the Fireman's Rule precludes a duty owed by
a negligent citizen to a safety officer called to assist such citizen. In the absence of a
duty, the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act do not apply. The statute states
that an injured employee "...may have an action for damages against the third person."
With application to the Fireman's Rule, there is no duty owed by the negligent citizen to
the safety officer, and consequently, no valid claim exists. Section 34A-2-106 does not
mandate otherwise.
Fordham cites and quotes five cases in support of his argument that this Court
should reject the Fireman's Rule. (Br. at 13-18). These cases constitute the extreme
minority. In Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210 (Or. 1984) (R. 99-105), the Oregon
Supreme Court found that the Fireman's Rule had been abolished by statute. In Banyai
v. Arruda, 799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990) (R. 118-20) and in Minnich v. Med-Waste
Inc., 654 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 2002) (R. 122-26), the Colorado Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of South Carolina refused to adopt the Fireman's Rule. Finally, in Lave
v. Newmann, 317 N.W.2d 779 (Neb. 1982) (R. 107-09) and Levindoskv v. Koehn, 841
A.2d 208 (Conn. 2004) (R. 111-16), the Supreme Courts of Nebraska and Connecticut
acknowledged the Fireman's Rule, but limited its scope to private premises cases. In
10

contrast, the vast majority of cases that have addressed the issue have recognized the
rationale behind the Fireman's Rule and have adopted it.
Finally, it should be pointed out that application of the Fireman's Rule has not
precluded Mr. Fordham from recovering damages from the individual who struck him,
and has not prevented him from receiving benefits under Worker's Compensation, a
system funded by the public, in place to compensate employees injured in the course and
scope of their employment. The Fireman's Rule precludes suits only against a citizen
whose ordinary negligence occasioned the presence of the public safety officer.
Independent acts of negligence that injure a safety officer at the scene, such as the
negligence of Zhi Wu, the driver who struck and injured Fordham, are not insulated from
suit. As the Supreme Court of Alaska noted in Moody, supra:
Jurisdictions adopting the Firefighter's Rule emphasize its narrowness; the
doctrine bars only recovery for the negligence that creates the need for the
public safety officer's service. (Footnote omitted.) Thus the Firefighter's
Rule does not apply to negligent conduct occurring after the police officer
or firefighter arrives at the scene or to misconduct other than that which
necessitates the officer's presence. (Footnote omitted.)

Modern courts stress interrelated reasons, based on public policy, for the
rule. The negligent party is said to have no duty to the public safety officer
to act without negligence in creating the condition that necessitates the
officer's intervention because the officer is employed by the public to
respond to such conditions and receives compensation and benefits for the
risks inherent in such responses. Requiring members of the public to pay
for injuries resulting from such responses effectively imposes a double
payment obligation on them. Further, because negligence is at the root of
11

many calls for public safety officers, allowing recovery would compound
the growth of litigation. (Footnote omitted.) Courts find an analogy in
cases in which a contractor is injured while repairing a condition that
necessitated his employment. In these cases, the owner is under no duty to
protect the contractor against risks arising from the condition the contractor
is hired to repair, and thus is not liable even if the condition was the
product of the owner's negligence.
Moody, 38 P.3d at 1141-42.
The Fireman's Rule is a common law recognition that public safety officers, such
as Fordham, accept compensation from the public for confronting hazards and rendering
assistance to individuals in need. The Rule recognizes that citizens should be free to
summon help from professional rescuers without concern that they might later be sued
by the public safety officer if he or she happens to be injured while confronting a hazard
in the course and scope of his or her employment. To hold otherwise would constitute
a deterrant to citizens summoning help when in need, and would essentially create a
double recovery for public safety officers injured in the course of their employment while
receiving compensation for doing their jobs.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Fireman's Rule is based on sound public policy principles and should be
adopted by this Court as it has been by a vast majority of other jurisdictions. Application
of the Fireman's Rule to the facts of this case negates any duty owed by Oldroyd to
Fordham, and the District Court therefore properly granted Defendant's Motion for
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Summary Judgment.
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